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The Rise of the US Federal Reserve 
as a World Monetary Authority: 
Revisiting the Volcker Shock
Kyuteg Lim
In the existing International Political Economy literature, the Volcker Shock 
has been widely regarded as historical significance in the development of 
international political economy. Three successive waves of IPE have evolved 
to highlight it respectively, as a subjugation of the US state to pressures of 
foreign states, to international financial power, and institutional configurations 
of US financial power. Without close attention to the particular role of the US 
Federal Reserve, however, these observations obscure the unprecedented 
process of a new mode of monetary governance. This paper argues that the 
Volcker Shock ushered in the rise of the US Federal Reserve as a world mon-
etary authority in a way that the inner-making process of autonomous mone-
tary policy became a new way of governing monetary and financial affairs. The 
Federal Reserve was able to pursue autonomous monetary policy far away 
from the economic management of the US government and at the same time 
to discipline banks in international financial markets. The Federal Reserve 
eventually established itself as a new kind of monetary authority between US 
government and international financial markets. This paper contributes to the 
study of international monetary power.
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INTRODUCTION
The Volcker Shock between 1979 and 1982 has continued to draw scholars of 
international political economy (IPE). The historical significance of the Volcker 
Shock is often considered to be a ‘restructuring moment’ of the relationship 
between labour and ‘finance capital’ in the development of neoliberalism 
(Panitch and Gindin 2009). Dumenil and Levy revisited the monetary event 
to draw attention to the ‘origin’ of neoliberalism (2004). The Volcker Shock is 
understood to offer a ‘solution’ to the US state struggling to meet social needs 
with declining fiscal resources by turning to market mechanisms (Krippner 
2011). The Volcker Shock is regarded as a significant turning point in the 
development of US financial capacity by attracting foreign capital into US 
financial markets (Duncan 2005; Konings 2011; Schwartz 2014). As such, there 
is little consensus on what the historical event means to the US state, the US 
society, and international financial markets.
It is possible to identify three ‘waves’ of IPE literature that, over time and to 
date, have emerged to offer contrasting analyses of the Volcker Shock. The first 
wave stressed it in inter-state relations. Robert Gilpin understood its historical 
significance as a reaction of the US state to the unwillingness of Germany to 
support the US dollar and import American inflation (1987, 331-332). That is, it 
was the first time that the US state made an important policy change in response 
to foreign pressures in the post-war era. In the context of broad discussions 
around the decline of US power, high levels of inflation experienced in the 
industrial world were closely associated with the instability of the post-Bretton 
Woods monetary system, caused by the declining power of the US state (Krasner 
1978, 82; Keohane 1982). Regarding the US dollar as a key mechanism of the 
stable Bretton Woods system, the unstable post-Bretton monetary system led 
to the conclusion that the US dollar as international money had come to an end 
(Kindleberger 1976, 35). The static relationship between the US dollar and the 
US state misled these theorists to identify the driving force of the international 
monetary system as the declining power of the US state. Consequently, the 1979 
monetary shock was primarily understood in an inter-state term.
Without denying the pressures of foreign countries, the second wave of IPE 
regarded the Volcker Shock as a turning point in the relationship between the US 
state and international financial markets. The Shock was by and large understood 
as the US state’s submission to the discipline of international financial markets, 
being forced resultantly to deregulate financial markets (Cerny 1993b; Gill 1993; 
Helleiner 1994). The powerful force of international financial markets in the 
1970s constrained and reduced the role of the state in ‘the financial decision-
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making process’ (Cerny 1993b, 171). For Stephen Gill, the Volcker Shock was an 
ultimate sign of how global financial pressures undermined the capacity of the 
US state to regulate economies (1993, 97–98). Erich Helleiner noted that the 
Federal Reserve’s turn to monetarism was motivated by the desire to restore the 
confidence of international financial markets and foreign governments in the US 
dollar, which in turn depended on the ability of the US state to accept austerity 
measures. That is, the US state was no longer able to pursue its autonomous 
economic policy and therefore submitted itself to ‘the discipline of international 
financial pressures’ (Helleiner 1994, 133). The puzzling question, then, was why 
the US state, subject to the stringencies of global financial markets, was able to 
fall further into its current account deficits after the Volcker Shock (see Figure 
A1).
More recent IPE literature views the turn to monetarism narrowly, as a 
project of ‘finance capital’, financial markets, against labour unions (Panitch and 
Gindin 2008). The Marxist position contrasting labour and capital is central 
in identifying how high levels of inflation decreased. It began with the Reagan 
administration’s attack on labour unions, and eventually led to not only win the 
‘confidence of financial markets but also put itself [the US state] in the position 
to be able to tell other states to likewise address their own balance of class forces’ 
(Ibid, 33). The difficulty of the Marxist approach is to ignore power struggles 
between investment banks and commercial banks within US financial markets 
(Hager 2012). More importantly, they do not pay attention to the actual role 
of the US Federal Reserve in relation to the US government and international 
financial markets.
The Volcker Shock is recently interpreted as ‘a new kind of control [by the 
Federal Reserve] over the dynamic of financial expansion’ (Konings 2011, 131). 
The Federal Reserve’s turn to monetarism involved the process of reconfiguring 
‘the key parameters of the relation between the US monetary authorities, 
American finance, and global finance in a way that enhanced rather than 
diminished the infrastructural capacities and policy autonomy of the American 
state’ (Ibid, 132). Such reconfiguration is identified by: i) an acceleration of 
financial innovation and the undiminished growth of liquidity creation; ii) 
social and financial reforms, led by the Reagan administration, which made 
more options available to the financial markets; and iii) a political willingness 
to provide an expansion of the Federal Reserve’s power over financial market 
governance (Ibid, 132–135). In consequence, the Volcker Shock’s high interest 
rates sucked funds into the financial markets by ‘transforming consumer price 
inflation into asset price inflation (Ibid, 137). The monetarist turn therefore 
did not dampen inflationary pressures but ‘made them more functional to US 
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financial power’ (Ibid,139) In moving beyond the state versus market dichotomy, 
Konings provided nuanced understanding of the monetarist turn as a process of 
institutional reconfiguration of US financial power. 
Nonetheless, the Federal Reserve’s new kind of control over the dynamic of 
financial expansion was not clearly explained. That is, the role of the Federal 
Reserve is passively seen as being only to re-obtain membership by imposing 
universal reserve requirements on all depository institutions. It was rather 
the financial innovation of private banks which responded to the monetarist 
turn so that nothing changed in the way private banks conducted their 
financial business. The monetary shock further intensified financial innovation 
and expanded a liquidity-generating process by drawing money from the 
manufacturing sector to the financial sect. Indeed, there is no new kind of 
Federal Reserve control over the dynamic of financial expansion. Without 
a focus on the act of the US central bank, the significance of institutional 
configuration is lost in order to understand how the US central bank began to re-
obtain authority in financial markets. Interpreting the significance of the Volcker 
Shock as a process of financial market dynamics does not help us to grapple with 
what the US central bank tried to achieve in relation to the US government and 
international financial markets.
The core argument advanced by this paper is that the Volcker Shock ushered 
in the unprecedented rise of the US Federal Reserve as a world monetary 
authority in relation to the US government and global financial markets. 
The Federal Reserve’s turn to monetary targeting was a new beginning of 
autonomous monetary governance which not only inflicted a severe damage to 
both the Carter and Regan administrations but disciplined important actors in 
financial markets as well. The Federal Reserve protected autonomous monetary 
policy in ways that the making of the monetary policy was legitimized within 
and outside the Federal Reserve. Therefore, they were able to persistently stick 
with the unprecedented approach to monetary targeting, even though there were 
constant attacks from politicians and social groups on the Federal Reserve and 
Volcker. The Federal Reserve redefined the social meaning of money in the US 
society by bringing inflation under control. 
The Volcker Shock involved a reassertion of the US Federal Reserve over the 
dynamic of global financial markets, in particular US domestic money market 
and the Eurodollar market. The same autonomous monetary policy (monetary 
targeting) enabled the Federal Reserve to directly intervene into the money 
markets. The direct intervention of the Federal Reserve aimed to discipline 
banks by disrupting the valuation of their assets and liabilities. Therefore, 
banks became forced to pay careful attention to what was decided at the Federal 
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Reserve. The internal workings of Federal Reserve monetary policy-making 
became a new means of monetary governance over the dynamics of financial 
expansion. The process of disciplining market actors eventually led the Federal 
Reserve to expand its role as lender of last resort beyond US banks. As such, 
the Volcker shock should be historicized in a way that the Federal Reserve 
established itself as a new kind of monetary authority in relation to the US state 
and global financial markets. 
This paper contributes to the study of US state capacity and international 
monetary power in the IPE literature. It has been widely accepted that the 
Volcker Shock was a post-war subjugation of the US state to accept austerity 
measures under the pressure of foreign states and international financial 
markets, as the first and second IPE waves tell us; the so-called ‘neoliberal 
restructuring.’ The role of the US state is characterized as ‘retreating’ from 
economic management. US state capacity has since then reduced, while 
US financial market power has increased. The neoliberal restructuring is 
fundamentally based on the dichotomous state versus market conception. The 
binary conception of state and market is seen to derive from the regulatory 
role of the state in markets. From a Weberian conception of the state, however, 
Hobson (1997) argues that the state is not a passive entity, controlled by private 
interests. Rather the role of the state is constitutive of making global financial 
markets (Seabrooke 2001). In this regard, the driving force of ‘restructuring’ the 
US society and financial markets was the US central bank as a state institution 
and a monetary authority. The dichotomous state versus market conception 
does not help us understand why the monetary capacity of the US state has 
continued to increase in the force of international financial markets. The US 
state has sold its own debt effectively despite its growing current account 
deficits since the early 1980s. But most of the IPE literature has focused on 
deep and liquid US financial markets as a key source of US financial power; that 
is, market power rather than state capacity. It is not just highly developed US 
financial markets to attract foreign capital but the linkage between the extended 
role of the US central bank as an international monetary authority and the 
primacy of the US dollar in international financial markets validates US debt in 
particular US Treasury securities as ‘risk’- free assets, crucial to the expansion 
of private international financial markets. This paper shows that the Volcker 
Shock was neither simply a submission of the US state to the power of global 
financial markets in order to establish confidence in the US dollar, nor a process 
of institutional reconfiguration more functional for US financial power. The 
historical event was the Federal Reserve’s attempt to gain control over the key 
mechanism of global financial expansion: the dynamic force of the US money 
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and the Eurodollar market. In this sense, institutional changes termed ‘financial 
deregulations’ such as the removal of capital controls, worked to increase the 
effectiveness of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy to reobtain a monetary 
sovereignty over the dynamic of international financial expansion. As such, the 
Volcker Shock needs to be understood not as a decline of US state capacity over 
international financial markets but rather a rise of US state capacity in governing 
international financial markets.
International monetary power is understood as a relational concept between 
countries economically involved in world economy. For example, international 
monetary power is exercised when a country changes economic policy or 
behaviour due to its monetary relationship with another country (Andrew 2006, 
9). Benjamin Cohen presents two forms of international monetary power in 
inter-state relations as the power to delay and the power to deflect adjustment 
costs (2006, 31-50). A core characteristic of international monetary power is 
who is enforced to adjust toward ‘international equilibrium’ through a means of 
exchange rate levels: who pays adjustment costs. In this way, US monetary power 
is seen to postpone adjustment since 1981 because of the unique status of the US 
dollar as a key international currency used in market actors and accumulated in 
foreign central banks (Ibid, 45). Cohen also notes that the international status of 
the US dollar contains its own downside. Dollar accumulations in foreign central 
banks mean ‘a form of external borrowing by the United States’ (Ibid). Foreign 
creditors would stop lending money to the US state because growing US current 
account deficits would give rise to a loss of foreign confidence in the US dollar.
Conceptualizing international monetary power as a relational property may 
be useful to analyze policy changes of countries involved, but international 
monetary power is narrowly characterized; specifically, international monetary 
power of the US is inadequately conceptualized. The study of international 
monetary power does not pay sufficient attention to the relationship between 
central banks and global finance, in particular the relationship among 
money, monetary authority and financial markets. The focus on international 
distribution of adjustment costs at the macro-level ignores a core institution 
of state capacity, the US central bank, as an international monetary authority 
at both micro- and macro-levels (e.g. Cohen 2016). The power of international 
financial markets has been generally believed to increase at the expense of 
state capacity in economic management since international capital flows 
have constrained a range of economic policy of a number of countries which 
have liberalized financial markets from the 1980s. This generalization does 
not necessarily apply to contemporary US monetary power in global finance. 
As shown throughout main sections, the dynamic process of global financial 
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expansion requires an extension of the role of the US central bank as a world 
monetary authority. The key source of international monetary power, as 
Susan Strange (1986) recognizes, is the international primacy of the US dollar 
which underpins dynamic financial market development. To be precise, the 
dynamic development of global financial markets has been rooted in the 
institutionalization of the US dollar as world money across borders since the 
early 1960s (Lim 2009). 
This paper shows that the essence of international monetary power lies on 
the capacity of the US monetary authority able to dictate the valuation of the 
US dollar and dollar assets across borders through the impact of US monetary 
policy on onshore and offshore money markets. The US Federal Reserve actually 
provided little ground with banks’ interest rate calculation by controlling total 
banking reserves. The linkage between the US monetary authority and valuation 
of the US dollar as world money led to an international realization of the US 
Federal Reserve as a world monetary authority over global financial markets 
and US government debt as safe financial assets for states and market actors 
across borders during the Volcker Shock. The Shock is a manifestation of US 
international monetary power in global financial markets since the repercussion 
of the US monetarism was globally affected in different parts of the world such 
as in East Europe and Latin America. Others like Japan increased US dollar 
holdings in the form of US Treasury securities. The US state may be seen, as 
Cohen (2016) tells us, to borrow from the rest of the world to avoid adjustment 
costs. Rather, the infrastructural power of the US dollar enables the US state to 
issue its own debt, globally accepted to foreign states and market actors across 
borders. A series of international financial crisis since the Volcker Shock has 
shown us that international demand for the US dollar and US Treasury securities 
in particular has not decreased but paradoxically increased, and therefore the 
role of the US central bank has been further extended, as shown in the recent 
global financial crisis. As far as the US state is seen as legitimate to US taxpayers, 
US monetary power is not likely to disappear soon. 
From a methodological point of view, this paper does not consider the role 
of political actors in the process of monetary policy making at the Federal 
Reserve. First, US monetary policy is decided at each FOMC meeting which 
excludes political actors and only includes governors, chairman, and presidents 
of Federal Reserve Banks. Unlike the Bank of Japan which allows political 
actors to participate in the decision making process of monetary policy without 
voting power (Gerdesmeier et al 2007), the US Federal Reserve System does 
not allow any political actor to participate in monetary policy making processes. 
Furthermore, even though Paul Volcker informed important political actors of 
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his plan in the Carter’s administration prior to the October operational shift, 
they could not reverse the decision of the Federal Reserve on monetary targeting. 
In a US constitutional sense, the US government spends federal budgets, but the 
US congress decides on government deficit finance and approves the US Federal 
Reserve to finance it (Axilrod 2011). It is US congress which holds responsibility 
for the legitimate existence of the US Federal Reserve as a monetary authority. 
During the Volcker Shock, the US congress supported the US Federal Reserve 
fighting against inflation by passing the 1980 Monetary Act which required all 
depository institutions to place more reserves at the Federal Reserve. For these 
reasons, this paper excludes the role of political actors in the analysis of the 
Volcker Shock. Rather it focuses on how the Federal Reserve brought inflation 
under control. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section of the 
paper focuses on how the Federal Reserve under Paul Volcker protected its 
autonomous monetary policy away from the economic management of the US 
government. The section traces back to the process of centralization of monetary 
policy at the Federal Reserve in Washington and briefly provides comparative 
views on the characterization of the Federal Reserve under previous chairmen 
and Paul Volcker. The section moves on to the analysis of the legitimization 
of the autonomous monetary policy within and outside the FOMC. The third 
section concentrates on how the Federal Reserve re-obtains authority over the 
dynamic force of money markets. The section begins with characterizing the 
dynamic force of money markets in the late 1970s and explains the impact of the 
monetary shock on money markets and the creation of offshore monetary space 
within the US. The section then moves on to explain the extended role of the 
US central bank beyond US banks. The fourth section explains why the Federal 
Reserve went back to the traditional monetary policy in mid-1982. The last 
section summarizes arguments and offer implications on central banking.
THE US FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE US GOVERNMENT
The Volcker Shock ushered in an unprecedented autonomy of monetary 
policy far distanced from the economic management of the US government. 
Autonomous monetary policy began with the appointment of Paul Volcker as 
new chairman. The 1979 October operational shift to targeting money supply 
instead of targeting interest rates led to the historically unique process of 
repositioning the Federal Reserve as a monetary authority in relation to the US 
government. As far as the autonomous monetary policy was legitimized, the 
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Federal Reserve was able to exploit uncertainty monetary targeting created. 
Before going over the detailed process of the autonomous monetary policy, it is 
necessary to trace back to the centralization of power under the Federal Reserve 
System1 (hereafter the Federal Reserve) in Washington. 
What enables Paul Volcker to implement a dramatic operational shift to 
targeting monetary growth in October 1979 is that prior chairmen centralized 
the power of the Board of Governors and its Chairman under the Federal Open 
Market Committee (hereafter FOMC), previously dominated by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York. Chairman McChesney Martin between 1951 and 
1970 undertook important steps in centralizing power in Washington. First 
Martin ended the FOMC’s Executive Committee, dominated by the New 
York Federal Reserve Bank. All members of the FOMC began to present their 
opinions and to discuss all policy options in the making of money policy 
from the second half of the 1950s (Meltzer 2009, 263). Second, the Board of 
Governors took over important aspects of open market operations under the 
FOMC. In the early 1960s, when the Federal Reserve attempted to operate 
foreign currency swaps with foreign central banks, who held responsibility for 
foreign currency operations within the Federal Reserve System was debated at 
a FOMC meeting (FOMC 1962 March): the international aspect of open market 
operations. Eventually, the Board of Governors ended the New York Reserve 
Bank’s major role in foreign currency operations. Furthermore, other important 
responsibilities such as budgeting were conferred upon the Board, and the 
Board’s staff increased from 608 to 790 between 1963 and 1968 (Meltzer 2009, 
493). 
The power of the chairman and the Board of Governors was further 
consolidated with the establishment of two policy documents: green and blue 
books date back to the mid-1960s. The policy documents are the Federal 
Reserve’s confidential briefing documents which are distributed ahead of each 
FOMC meeting. The green book provides an analysis of the US economy and 
international economy. It contains a huge amount of statistical resources devoted 
to economic projections. The blue book concentrates on money market conditions 
1  The Federal Reserve System is the central bank of the US. The Federal Reserve System con-
stitutes the Federal Reserve Board of Governors in Washington and twelve Federal Reserve Banks 
in different regions across the US. The Federal Open Market Committee is the body of the Federal 
Reserve System that sets national monetary policy. The FOMC makes all decisions regarding the 
conduct of open market operations, which affect the federal funds rate (the rate at which banks lend 
to each other). The FOMC consists of twelve voting members – the seven members of the Federal 
Reserve Board, including its chairman, and the president of New York Reserve Bank and the four 
presidents of the remaining eleven Reserve Banks on a rotation basis (Mayer 2001, 144)
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and provides alternative policy options for FOMC consideration (Deane and 
Pringle 1994, 222). The latter in particular helps the FOMC to consider whether 
monetary policy toward tightness or ease needs to be implemented during the 
period between FOMC meetings. The interpretation of the numerical data in 
the blue book is decisively determined by the Board staff. Thus it enhanced the 
power of the Board against the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Axilrod 2011, 
46). The interpretation of any FOMC policy decision and its implementation are 
held in the hands of Board Governors and its chairman. According to Sherman 
Maisel, as a governor between 1965 and 1972, the chairman could wield ‘about 
45 percent of the total power relative to the other board members’ in the FOMC 
(quoted in Deane and Pringle 1994, 228). David Jones described the culture 
of the Federal Reserve as “chairman-centered” (1991, 53). Martin ensured 
that the central power of the Federal Reserve System, the making of monetary 
policy under the FOMC, rested on the Board of Governors and its chairman in 
Washington (Axilrod 2011, 51).
In the late 1970s during which inflation was rapidly rising, the credibility 
of the Federal Reserve was severely undermined by G. William Miller as new 
chairman. President Carter appointed him to succeed Arthur Burns on March 8 
1978. As a former corporate chief executive of Texton, Miller was neither trained 
in economics nor familiar with monetary policy, even though he was one of the 
board members of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (Axilrod 2011, 77). Given 
a lack of expertise in monetary policy and technical monetary matters, the new 
chairman had to learn monetary terms and needed to listen to opinions of fellow 
Board members highly experienced in monetary affairs (Deane and Pringle 1994, 
231). This was a sign of weakness in his leadership in tackling high inflationary 
expectations for which his expertise and decisive leadership was needed most 
at the Federal Reserve. When a chairman is seen as weak, the coherence of 
the FOMC monetary policy making is undermined (Axilrod 2011, 228). Miller 
brought his corporate management style to the FOMC. He placed ‘a three 
minutes egg timer on the table at board meetings to limit the often rambling 
discourse’ (Treaster 2004, 51). At a June FOMC meeting in 1978, Miller voted 
against the majority who wanted to raise the discount rate. His stance suggested 
that the chairman was not serious about controlling inflation (ibid). He could 
not effectively lead the FOMC and the Board with him (Dean and Pringle 1994, 
228). He lost his chairman status within and outside the Federal Reserve. Miller 
was the last non-professional Federal Reserve chairman. Since then, the Federal 
Reserve has had strongly professional leadership, first from Paul Volcker, then 
Alan Greenspan. All of them are trained in economics and possess intellectual 
expertise in monetary policy.
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Under pressure of climbing inflation and the declining credibility of the 
Federal Reserve, Carter appointed Paul Volcker as new chairman in August 
19792. The Federal Reserve under the new chairman began the unprecedented 
process of autonomous monetary policy away from the government. President 
Carter “purchased” credibility of Paul Volcker (Hall 2008, 177; Johnson 1998, 
176). Carter initially contacted some people like David Rockfeller to consider 
the Federal Reserve chairing post. They all turned down Carter’s offer and 
instead recommend Paul Volcker (Treaster 2004, 60). Anthony Solomon, 
undersecretary of the Treasury for monetary affairs, suggested Paul Volcker 
because he reasoned that Volcker not only had the technical understanding of 
monetary policy, but could lead the difficult decision-making process of the 
FOMC effectively and articulate monetary policy decisions to the public as well 
(Deane and Pringle 1994, 99). None doubted his intellectual credentials inside 
and outside the Carter administration, but the Carter administration concerned 
that Volcker would not be a team player (Axilrod 2011, 231). Unlike Miller, 
Volcker possessed intellectual expertise and experiences in monetary policy. 
He served as undersecretary of the Treasury for international monetary affairs 
in the early 1970s and president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York from 
1974 until 1979 (Mayer 2001, 192). He was supported by three prominent Board 
members such as Henry Wallich, Charles Partee and Lyle Gramley within the 
Federal Reserve (Bartels 1985, 38). His intellectual competence and professional 
experiences in monetary policy seemed to obtain strong leadership in the FOMC 
and the Federal Reserve (Hall 2008; Goodfriend 1986). 
The Federal Reserve’s traditional approach to interest rates targeting could 
not have impact on inflationary expectations. When Volcker came to office in 
early August 1979, like previous chairmen, who attempted to control inflation 
from the mid-1970s but shied away from monetary tightening3 (Burns 1987, 
692), the Federal Reserve under Paul Volcker initially attempted to target 
interest rates through either the discount rate4 or open market operations5. 
2  Inflation rate was reaching about 12 percent, and the real return on Treasury bills as a barom-
eter of federal funds rates was negative (Meulendyke 1998, 193)
3  They did not implement monetary policy far distanced from the economic management of the 
US government. The relationship between the Federal Reserve and the US government is ambiguous 
during the 1970s (Woolley 1984). The US Federal Reserve seems to be independent but not autono-
mous. That is, attempts to control inflation through the traditional monetary policy were not intend-
ed to inflict a severe damage to the economic management of the US government in the 1970s.
4  The rate at which the Federal Reserve would charge banks borrowing at its discount window
5  The Federal Reserve purchases and sales US government securities to provide a certain level 
of reserves required to achieve the desired target of interest rates (Mayer 2001, 23)
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However, Federal Reserve watchers, hired by big banks, were able to speculate 
on movements of interest rates by monitoring the action of the Federal Reserve 
in open market operations. The signal the new chairman sent was not going to 
change a course of monetary policy (Treaster 2004, 148). Expectation on interest 
rate movements encouraged banks to speculate on the value of the US dollar, 
financial assets and commodities in various financial markets, and could not 
dampen inflationary expectations in the public (Federal Reserve Bulletin 1979). 
Volcker and board members were not satisfied with the traditional approach. 
Precisely they informally decided to turn to monetary targeting on September 
28, 1979 (Johnson 1998, 176), before Paul Volcker visited the Belgrade meeting 
of the International Monetary Fund in the following week during which it was 
assumed that he made up his mind toward monetary targeting under pressures 
of foreign states or international financial markets, as the first and second waves 
of IPE tell us. 
Rather, they turned to targeting total banking reserves to create uncertainty in 
inflationary expectations in October 1979. This October operational shift led the 
Federal Reserve to purse an unprecedented process of autonomous monetary 
policy far distanced from the economic need of the US government. Krippner 
(2007) observed that the reserve strategy was a political strategy to deflect the 
public from blaming the Federal Reserve for high levels of interest rate in the 
image that markets determined interest rates; social and political reaction to 
high interest rates was muted (489-90). However, the operational shift was 
more than simply a political cover. The sphere of macroeconomic policy is 
in general less affected by domestic politics and the public’s opinions (Odell 
1982; Hall 1993). More important, the traditional interest rate management 
was kindling a flame in inflationary expectations embedded in the public’s 
belief in political and economic progresses in the post-war era (Burns 1985). 
The concern with the inflationary flame was made worse by linkages between 
the dynamic force of the Eurodollar market and the US money market (Kelly 
1977; Hawley 1987). Federal Reserve officials were deeply concerned with the 
impact of the expansionary force of the Eurodollar market on the US dollar, US 
inflation and the Federal Reserve (Wallich 1979; Frydle 1979-80). The problem 
of monetary linkages between US inflation and the offshore money market will 
be detailed in the next section. The Federal Reserve under Paul Volcker turned 
to targeting monetary reserves intended to create uncertainty: high but volatile 
interest rates. Inflationary expectations were widely held in businesses, labour 
unions, consumers in construction and housing sectors, and banks in money 
and financial markets (Federal Reserve Bulletin 1979). The October operational 
shift was intended to introduce ‘a new uncertainty into the market . . . the new 
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uncertainty will have the effect of cooling the speculative activity and perhaps 
have an impact on those demands for credit that are based purely on inflationary 
expectations’ (Rice, quoted in FOMC 1979 October, 22). As closely looking at 
monetarist experiences in Germany, Volcker understood that monetary targeting 
would serve the interests of discipline domestically and internationally, and 
that they were intertwined (Johnson 1998, 178), as far as the new operation 
procedure continued to be pursued over time.
From late September 1979, Volcker began to outline his plan (monetary 
targeting) to William Miller, secretary of the Treasury, and Charles Schultze, 
chairman of President Carter’s Council of Economic Advisers (Mayer 2001, 193). 
They worried about the negative impact of monetary targeting on President 
Carter’s re-election in the following year. Furthermore, the monetary plane 
would induce ‘uncertainty and inflexible monetary policy’ (Treaster 2004, 
155). Rather than the monetary plan, Miller and Schultz suggested a 2 percent 
increase in rates which President Carter would agree on. However, uncertainty 
was exactly what the Federal Reserve aimed to create in a way that controlling 
money supply would induce volatile interest rates unexpectedly. Volcker 
implemented monetary targeting to surprise the public and markets despite 
protests from the White House about the damage to Carter’s re-election chances 
(Bartels 1985, 38). 
The question becomes how the Federal Reserve was able to persistently 
maintain the autonomous monetary policy for two and a half years, if the 
monetary targeting was more than a political cover. In 1978, as president of 
the New York Federal Reserve Bank, Volcker understood that the key means to 
dampen inflationary expectations was to maintain announced monetary targets 
consistently over time (1978, 332). The answer rests on the legitimization of 
monetary policy making within and outside the Federal Reserve in several 
important ways. First, dissenting views within the FOMC were managed in a way 
that consensus building was prioritized toward uncertainty over other means. 
There was the policy debate on whether the Federal Reserve wanted to go back 
to the traditional monetary policy or stick with the present policy at several 
times between October 1979 and August 1982. At an April 1980 meeting, FOMC 
members such as such as Partee, Rice and Roose, concerned about volatility of 
interest rates and a fall into economic recession, in particular in the housing and 
auto-related sectors of the economy (FMOC 1980 April, 22). However, Volcker 
argued that the only reason for the present operating target was ‘the nature of 
uncertainty it created’. He went on to say that the economy was not in rapid 
recession and that ‘the most important objective of the Federal Reserve today is 
to restore credibility in our willingness and our ability to stick with a long-range 
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policy and not change the course’ (Ibid, 25-26). This kind of the debate also 
occurred in September 1980 and February 1981 (FOMC 1980 September; FOMC 
1981 February). Different views on the monetary target were allowed to express 
their particular concerns, reflecting on geographical economic situations, 
affected by the money control. However, the majority of the FOMC members 
were convinced that control over inflationary expectations was not to reverse its 
present operating approach until a clear sign of economic recession. The public 
still suspected the seriousness of the Federal Reserve toward inflation control so 
that reversing the operational procedure would inflame inflationary expectations 
again. This point was emphasized by the chairman at each FOMC meeting. In 
this way, the FOMC was able to stick with the present operation and to make one 
voice consistently heard to the outside world.
Second, the FOMC’s pragmatic approach to monetarism provides room for 
policy adjustment to developing monetary conditions. At each FOMC meeting, 
officials decided to target the level of monetary growth, the level of M1, M2 and 
M3. In particular, they paid close attention to MI as a policy guide. It does not 
mean that they succeeded in controlling total banking reserves; they actually 
failed to meet the desired targets (Greider 1987; Mayer 2001; Krippner 2011). 
What the quantitative approach to monetary targets provided was that ‘the 
statistical basis for determining the target for reserve aggregates consistent with 
the FOMC’s policy decision entailed considerable leeway for staff judgement’ 
(Axilrod 2011, 91). The commonly shared quantified data provided a legitimate 
basis for understanding and adjusting to monetary conditions. FOMC members 
consistently monitored and assessed interactions between the application of 
monetary targets and changing economic developments; in Johnson’s term 
(1998, 6), “learning while governing.” They were able to adjust the range of the 
monetary target if new data came along. Two episodes – the summer of 1980 
and the period between late 1981 and early 1982 – discredited the guiding 
measure of M1 as the controlling monetary aggregate. In April 1980, M1 was 
rapidly shrinking (FOMC 1980 April). More than 17 billion dollars disappeared 
(Greider 1987, 194). FOMC members were puzzled by the dramatic and 
unexpected decline in the money supply. It raised a new question: what should 
monetary targeting set the proper level of M1 to be? The Federal Reserve bought 
government securities and injected a huge amount of new money – $5.4 billion 
– into the banking system. From that point, M1 grew rapidly and bank lending 
also increased over the next few months (Greider 1987, 201–206). If demand 
for reserves exceeded the target of monetary growth established at the FOMC, 
additional reserves through open market operations were not supplied (Krippner 
2011, 117). In this way, they continued to stick with the operating method by 
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adjusting the range of monetary reserves consistent with developing monetary 
conditions. Despite Carter’s 1980 credit control intervention, the Federal 
Reserve’s monetary actions were remarkably consistent with its announced 
monetary targets (Johnson 1998, 181). Indeed, Volcker was satisfied with the 
progress of monetary developments consistent with monetary targets during the 
year of 1980 as a whole (Federal Reserve Bulletin 1981). Unlike monetarists who 
believe in a consistent level of monetary growth, Federal Reserve policymakers 
held a pragmatic approach to monetary targeting, as demonstrated above. They 
held confidence in statistical data but made monetary targets adjustable to 
developing monetary conditions. 
The sphere of monetary policy making is politically sensitive in nature. It 
was hard for any social group or politicians to intervene into the making of 
monetary policy under the FOMC. It was no denial that FOMC members made 
highly informed decisions toward monetary targeting. Green and blue books 
contained an enormous amount of statistical data regarding financial markets, 
the US economy and international economy. The FOMC had to swallow a great 
deal of information before making a policy directive (Deane and Pringle 2004, 
222). During the monetary shock, even though there were constant attacks 
from individual politicians, small businesses and labour unions, affected by the 
restrictive monetary policy, on the Federal Reserve, the US monetary authority 
was little challenged (Bartels 1985). Congress supported the Federal Reserve’s 
fighting against inflation by passing the 1980 Monetary Act, which in part helped 
the Federal Reserve to ‘take stronger action than we probably could by the other 
technique (FOMC 1980 March, 19). Monetary policy can have a significant effect 
on wealth distribution in society (Kirshner 2003; Ingham 2004; Hall 2008). If 
monetary policy was pursued to achieve inflation less than 10 percent, economic 
growth would be higher (Kirshner 2003). The key concern would be how to 
maintain inflation between 3 percent and below 10 percent with better economic 
outcome. Indeed, politicians are limited to intervene in the decision-making 
process of monetary policy because short-term political gains would lead to 
monetary disorders which disrupt the healthy process of economic transactions. 
More important, the impact of ‘monetary policy is so comprehensive’ that the 
attempt of any social groups or politicians to influence monetary policy would be 
over-politicized (Johnson 1998, 6). Thus, many democratic governments have 
decided to depoliticize monetary policy by placing the making of monetary policy 
in the hands of unelected officials with long tenures (Blinder 1998, 56). 
Furthermore, Federal Reserve officials protected their monetary policy 
through active involvement of public communications. Their engagement in 
public communications was not simply rhetoric. The Humphrey-Hawkins Act 
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of 1978 required the chairman of the Federal Reserve to testify the explanation 
of monetary policy decisions before Congress twice a year (Greider 1987, 96; 
Fischer 1994, 293). It was rather ‘an empty ritual’ because relevant policy 
explanation was avoided (Blinder 1998, 29). However, the public testimony 
served two important roles. First, it allowed the Federal Reserve to communicate 
effectively to the public and markets by demonstrating the seriousness of 
monetary targeting in order to influence inflationary expectations. In December 
1979, Volcker said before Congress that ‘in changing the emphasis (the monetary 
target), we necessarily must be less concerned with day-to-day or week-to-
week fluctuations in interest rates because those interest rates will respond 
to shifts in demand for money and reserves’ (Federal Reserve Bulletin 1979, 
960). The seriousness of the Federal Reserve was further improved by the 
Reagan administration’s attack on labour unions in August 1981 (Gregory 
1985, 39). Federal Reserve officials also justified the restrictive monetary policy 
effectively. The chairman actually ‘went around the country giving speeches. 
He always made a point of stressing that the Federal Reserve continued to stick 
to the tight monetary policy (Axilrod 2011, 99). In February 25, 1981, Volcker 
explained technical details of the monetary policy such as measures of monetary 
aggregates in reference to the established monetary target during the previous 
year as a whole (Federal Reserve Bulletin 1981 March, 237). Without confidence 
in statistical data collected, Federal Reserve officials would not demonstrate 
what they found in public. They even provided “seminars” for interested outside 
experts and economists (Ibid, 238). Thus, they effectively justified the restrictive 
monetary policy in the eyes of the public. The Federal Reserve conducted public 
communications in ways that protected its own policy and exploit uncertainty 
at the same time. The combination of policy actions and rhetoric worked to 
dampen inflationary expectations (Greider 1987, 41).
Under the Reagan administration, the Federal Reserve continued to maintain 
restrictive monetary policy (high levels of interest rates) even after it brought 
down inflation to around 5 percent in mid-1982 (Krippner 2007, 492). One 
important reason was that Federal Reserve officials were concerned with 
possibility of inflationary resurgence (FOMC 1982 June-July, 7). The economic 
policy of the Reagan administration was at odds with the Federal Reserve 
under Volcker. The US Treasury was home to monetarists and supply-side 
economists (Axilrod 2011, 102). These economists were not interested in the 
details of monetary policy operations. The administration provided tax cuts to 
businesses and increased budget deficits (Johnson 1998, 186). Chairman Volcker 
persistently spoke against budget deficits which would instigate inflationary 
psychology (Greider 1987, 482-506). Top officials in the Reagan administration 
The Rise of the US Federal Reserve as a World Monetary Authority: Revisiting the Volcker Shock | 319
were calling for Volcker to resign in 1982: his term was expiring in 1983. Donald 
Regan, secretary of the US Treasury, made harsh comments such as “tyranny” 
on Volcker (Treaster 2004, 173). Berly Sprinkel, undersecretary of the Treasury 
for monetary affairs, did not simply believe that the Federal Reserve alone 
held control over the importance of money supply (Deane and Pringle 1994, 
103). Despite all these attacks from the Reagan administration, Volcker was re-
appointed by President Reagan in August 1983. 
THE US FEDERAL RESERVE AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
The Volcker Shock was not only about autonomous monetary governance 
distanced from the US government but a reassertion of monetary sovereignty as 
well over the dynamic of global financial markets, underpinned by US dollars. 
The same autonomous monetary policy (monetary targeting) enabled the Federal 
Reserve to regain control over the key mechanism of global financial expansion: 
the US money market and the Eurodollar market. The Federal Reserve directly 
intervened into the money markets by unsettling the valuation of banks’ assets 
and liabilities. The Federal Reserve began to extend its role by opening privileged 
access to a form of government debt, the most transferable of all dollars, to any 
US-based depository institutions well beyond US banks. Thus, the Volcker Shock 
was a fresh step in the process of the Federal Reserve extending its role beyond 
the US market. It is necessary to characterize the dynamic force of US domestic 
money markets and the Eurodollar market, causing a deep concern for Federal 
Reserve officials prior to the Volcker Shock. 
The exponential growth of the Eurodollar market in the late 1970s deeply 
concerned Federal Reserve officials with its impact on the weakness of the US 
dollar, US inflation and the US central bank. From early 1979, the US Treasury 
and the Federal Reserve began to initiate international cooperation to regulate 
the Euromarkets. Anthony Solomon, undersecretary of the US Treasury, 
suggested that central banks impose reserves on banks operating in the 
Eurodollar market (Hawley 1984, 152). In April 1979, William Miller, chairman 
of the Federal Reserve, put forward the robust proposal that all BIS members be 
required to impose reserves on Eurodollar deposits at their own banks operating 
offshore (Dale 1984, 27). The attempted reserve obligation showed a clear 
concern over the expansionary tendency of the Eurodollar market as being a 
source of the dollar crisis: the weakness of the dollar and its associated inflation. 
However, the Eurodollar reserve proposal faced strong opposition from foreign 
central banks such as the Bank of England (Ibid, 28) and from the US banking 
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community (Helleiner 1994, 137). The reserve requirement seemed to be 
practically infeasible (Hawley 1984). Henry Wallich, a governor of the Federal 
Reserve, argued that reserve requirements would derive Eurodollar businesses 
from London to other markets (1979, 21-24). The growth of the offshore money 
market in the late 1970s was 25 percent annually, whereas German money 
markets were growing at about 10 percent (Frydle 1979-80, 19). The Eurodollar 
market would ‘overtake the creation of domestic credit within a foreseeable 
period’ (Hawley 1984, 138). Unlike economists who viewed the Eurodollar 
market as a recycling mechanism, Federal Reserve officers were seriously 
concerned with the rapid growth of the Eurodollar market and its impact on 
the US dollar, US inflation, and the monetary policy of the US Federal Reserve 
(Wallich 1979; Frydle 1979-80).
Closely linked to the Eurodollar market, the US money market experienced 
a dramatic growth during the 1970s due largely to liability management of 
US banks. With regulatory relaxation on deposit rates in the early 1970s, US 
banks issued a large amount of Certificates of Deposit (hereafter CDs). Unlike 
traditional (time) deposits, which were illiquid until maturity dates, CDs were 
negotiable and could be turned to liquid cash within a short period of time (Einzig 
and Quinn 1977, 32). CDs enabled US banks to produce more money (liabilities) 
at a given level of capital. As Walter (1991) and Konings (2008) stressed, banks 
became no longer passive deposit takers and active to make money markets 
for their own good. The US money market, fluctuating at around $1 billion 
along with the low volume of CD issuance during the 1960s, experienced a 
dramatic growth from $ 7 billion in 1970 to $ 56.5 billion in 1975 (Kelly 1977, 
129). The CD became the ‘leading money market instrument in the US market’ 
(Versluyen 1981, 74). The dynamics of domestic and offshore dollar markets 
posed a challenge to the Federal Reserve’s traditional monetary policy: interest-
rate targeting. Its traditional monetary policy was not making any difference to 
the dynamic force of the money markets. More specifically, the daily purchase 
and sale of US government securities for short-term interest rate management 
was not having real effect on the deteriorating terms of dollar-based contracts 
in the 1970s. The Federal Reserve was failing to maintain the credibility of the 
US dollar, crucial to its raison d’être as a monetary authority. The US monetary 
authority should have acted to regain its firm control over the monetary forces.
The October operational shift in 1979 was a direct action of monetary 
sovereignty to regain control over money markets. After consulting with Federal 
Reserve officials, Peter D. Sternlight, Manager of the Open Market Desk, did 
nothing to reassure government securities traders as to ‘what a proper interest 
rate was for a Treasury bill or a government bond’ (Greider 1987, 128). It did 
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not mean that interest rates were completely ignored, but the framing of widely 
fluctuating interest rates was intended to affect the way they were set by the 
market. Unlike the traditional interest rate management, the new operational 
approach to monetary targeting created uncertainty, volatile interest rates, as 
emphasized in the previous section. Volcker said at a Federal Reserve meeting 
that ‘market participants are living with fragile expectations and inspired rumour 
and all the rest from day to day’ (FOMC 1979 October, 4). ‘People in markets are 
nervous enough so that policy, for the first time, is beginning to bite’ (Volcker 
quoted, in FOMC 1980 March, 7). Although the FOMC initially established a 
four percent range for the federal funds rate at its October meeting, the range of 
interest rate was substantially widened (FOMC 1980 February). For example, 
the federal funds rates fluctuated between the highest end of 20 percent and the 
bottom of 8 percent between October 1979 and March 1980. The volatility of 
short-term rates was intended to be determined by how FOMC members judged 
progresses and conditions of the monetary target, as discussed in the previous 
section. 
Uncertainty the US monetary authority created provided market actors 
with little ground to foster their perceived conception of interest rates in any 
market reality. The confidence of banks in interest rate calculation dramatically 
dissipated. Market actors could only predict interest rate movements on 
publications offered by the Federal Reserve. But publications were often vague 
and unpredictable. For example, the Federal Reserve published the data of 
M1 weekly, and the weekly information became the primary focus of market 
operators (Smith 1987, 131). But the data available did not guarantee their 
market speculation since the targeting of M1 was widened and necessarily 
brought about unpredictable short-term interest rates. Big banks which 
speculated on the value of the US dollar, financial assets and commodities like 
gold, suffered enormously (Greider 1987). They now needed to pay careful 
attention to the intentions of the Federal Reserve enunciated at each meeting 
of the FOMC (Smith 1987). This was a new mode of monetary governance 
initiated by the Federal Reserve in the way that the process of Federal Reserve 
monetary policy making under the FOMC tended to influence banks’ lending 
and investment decisions. 
With monetary targeting, the US monetary authority undertook one further 
important measure against big banks. It ‘placed a special marginal reserve 
requirement of 8 percent on increase in managed liabilities of larger banks 
(including US agencies and branches of foreign banks) because that source of 
funds, which is not included in the usual definition of the money supply has 
financed much of the recent excessive builup in bank credit (Federal Reserve 
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Bulletin 1979, 960, emphasis added). This measure was a clear sign to large 
banks to be cautious toward their liability management. The reserve measure 
was later extended to the idea of universal reserve requirement on all depository 
institutions in 1980. The combination of unpredictable interest rates and the 
extra reserve requirement was motivated to dampen the speculation of big 
banks in various financial markets. Thus, the October 1979 operational shift 
can be seen as the start of a process of the Federal Reserve reasserting itself as 
a monetary authority over financial markets broadly and money markets more 
specifically. The US monetary authority aimed to discipline market actors by 
intentionally unsettling the valuation of their assets and liabilities. 
The Volcker Shock had direct impact on the international money market. As 
discussed above, the Eurodollar market was largely underpinned by US dollars. 
More specifically, international dollar loans during the 1970s were distributed on 
the basis of renewable rates, determined by the Eurodollar market (Mendelsohn 
1980, 71). They became subjected to uncertain money market rates, dictated by 
the Federal Reserve’s policy change. High levels of Eurodollar rate were fed into 
the premium cost on the international loans and increased the dollar debt burden 
of developing countries, which had borrowed heavily from the Euromarkets 
during the 1970s (BIS 1981, 1982). Short-term volatile rates in the Eurodollar 
market were further reinforced by the tight monetary policy of foreign central 
banks such as the Bank of England (Smith 1987) and German and Japanese 
central banks (BIS 1980, 106). From late 1981, highly unstable short-term interest 
rates intensified the uncertainty of the Eurodollar market and began to increase 
the dollar debt burden of sovereign borrowers. Dollar debts owed to developing 
countries started to be rescheduled significantly; ‘more than $ 2 billion for Poland 
and more than $ 4 billion for Turkey’ (Kreicher 1982, 20).
In late 1981, the creation of International Banking Facilities (IBFs) played a 
part in reducing the impact of the offshore money market on US inflation by 
making a monetary spatial distinction between the US sovereign monetary space 
and IBFs. The original plan of IBFs was to restrict banking regulations such as 
detailed information of financial statements, transactions and owners of banks 
(Hawley 1984, 156). The Federal Reserve, however, due to the opposition of 
foreign central banks and private banks, modified the regulations and imposed 
other limitations which did not apply to foreign branches of US banks in offshore 
money centres. In particular, the Federal Reserve was concerned with ‘the effect 
that the adoption of such proposals [IBF proposals] would have on the conduct 
of monetary policy and competition among groups of US banks’ (Key 1982, 
566). IBF banks, like being in the Eurodollar market, were exempted for reserve 
requirements and interest rate ceilings (Key 1982; Chrystal 1984). The Federal 
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Reserve put limitations on activities of IBFs, differentiated from domestic money 
markets in several ways. First, IBF depositing and lending were restricted to 
non-US residents. Second, ‘the minimum transaction with an IBF by a nonbank 
customer is $ 100,000 which limits the activity of IBFs to governments, major 
corporations or other international banks’. Finally, the issue of negotiable 
instruments such as CDs was not permitted due to the maintenance of the 
separation between IBFs and the domestic money markets (Chrystal 1984, 6-7). 
These limitations placed on IBFs show that the principle concern of the Federal 
Reserve was to distinguish IBF accounts from domestic banking accounts in the 
US. Indeed, IBFs attracted many US banks from the Eurodollar market (Key 
1982) and from other offshore centers such as the Cayman Islands and Nassau 
in the Bahamas (Strange 1986, 50). By the end of 1983, IBFs represented about 
8 percent of the offshore money market (Chrystal 1984, 9).
The Volcker Shock led the Federal Reserve to eventually extend the role of 
lender of last resort beyond US banks. It opened privileged access to a form of 
US government debt, the most transferable of all dollars, directly issued by the 
Federal Reserve, for foreign banks as long as they were based in the US market. 
The 1980 Monetary Control Act subjected all depository institutions to universal 
reserve requirements so that the Federal Reserve could obtain an extended 
control over them. The significance of this measure did not lie in the increased 
total banking reserves at the US central bank. It was rather expected that total 
reserves would be $15 billion down (Timberlake 1985, 100; Greider 1987, 160). 
The impact of the universal reserve requirement increased the costs of holding 
reserves, in particular for small banks and thrift institutions, whereas member 
banks increased their profits (Greider 1987, 160–165; Allen and Wilhelm 1988).
Since all depository institutions were subject to reserve holdings at the US 
central bank, all US-based foreign banks were entitled to access the discount 
window and borrowing privileges as Federal Reserve member banks. This 
held ‘regardless of whether the institution [was] owned by US or foreign 
residents and regardless of whether it [was] a branch or affiliate of a foreign 
institution’ (Guttentag and Herring 1993, 19). The privileged openness to the 
most transferable of all dollars was particularly attractive to international banks 
operating outside their country of origin, since the US dollar at the Federal 
Reserve was the most liquid money at money markets at home and abroad. From 
the early 1970s, US government securities in particular US Treasury bills were 
regarded as ‘risk’-free assets in emerging global financial markets (Lim 2019). 
US government securities became more valuable in the face of international debt 
crisis since US government debts were now the most-sought after debt. The tight 
monetary policy of the Federal Reserve actually increased the global demand 
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of US financial debts in general such as US mortgage securities (Duncan 2005, 
106) and US government debts more specifically (Greider 1987, 561-563).
The comprehensive openness of the US central bank’s discount window to 
all US-based depository institutions necessarily broadened the conception 
of collateral for the supply of dollar liquidity. Collateral of a troubled bank 
was traditionally seen as sound, but often political, for the Federal Reserve to 
provide dollar liquidity immediately to the bank (Kindleberger 1978, 165-181; 
Spero 1980, 148). The 1980 Act expanded ‘the eligible collateral provision for 
Federal Reserve notes outstanding to include the fully guaranteed obligations 
of a foreign government or the agency of a foreign government as well as any 
financial assets that may be purchased by Reserve Banks’ (Timberlake 1985, 
99). Federal Reserve money could be issued specifically for political objectives 
or for rescuing any type of a financial institution, regardless of whether their 
collateral was viewed as suitable for Federal Reserve money or open market 
operations. The widened version of collateral provision for and privileged access 
to Federal Reserve money further increased the attractiveness of US debts in 
the round, since the US dollar accessible to the central bank’s discount window 
was important to the private practice of issuing dollar debts and transferring 
them outside the US market, while the Federal Reserve increased its potential 
burden for the supply of dollar liquidity in the future. With the onset of the Latin 
American and East European debt crises, foreign investors were attracted to 
various US financial debts for safety and high interest rates.
THE RETURN TO THE TRADITIONAL MONTARY POLICY
In the spring of 1982, the Federal Reserve faced three intertwined problems. 
First, the basic measure of M1 as a monetary target completely broke down. 
From late 1981, M1 growth had been well above its target. In early 1982, 
the assumed link between monetary growth and real economic activities 
completely broke down due to unexpected monetary growth in spite of 
US economic recession (FOMC 1982 May, 29-30). This confirms that the 
mechanistic relationship between money and real economic activity could 
not fundamentally be established: money was more than a neutral medium of 
exchange in facilitating real economic transactions. Rather, what constitutes 
money essentially is a social relation of credit and debt measured in a money of 
account (Ingham 2004; Hall 2008). Money as a social relation of credit and debt 
has developed independently of the process of real economic processes such as 
in production and trade (see Ingham 2004; Wray 1998 for more detail). Frank 
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Morris, a member of the FOMC, acknowledged that ‘M1 no longer provided a 
reliable guide for steering interest rates lower’ (quoted in Krippner 2011, 121). 
Second, the US economic recession would be made worse if the Federal 
Reserve continued to tighten monetary policy. Since inflation came down to 
around 5 percent in mid-1982, monetary policy toward ease was necessary to 
recover economic recession with caution on resurgence of inflation. Lastly, 
the impending international debt crisis was rapidly developing with regard to 
Latin American countries (FOMC 1982 June-July). Federal Reserve officers like 
Frank Morris, Anthony Solomon and Lyle Gramley, argued that the Federal 
Reserve must abandon monetary targeting regardless of what M1 or monetary 
aggregates indicated. From 1 July 1982, the Federal Reserve began to loosen its 
grip on banking reserves. As more money became available in the US economy, 
interest rates decreased. Falling but still-high interest rates revived the financial 
markets, such as the stock market and the bond market (Greider 1987, 537). 
Summer 1982 was thus a turning point for the Federal Reserve to go back to 
the traditional monetary policy: the targeting of interest rates. The experiment 
of pragmatic monetarism was officially abandoned (FOMC 1982 June-July, 
30). Even though the Federal Reserve failed to control monetary aggregates 
during the Volcker shock, it dictated the valuation of banks’ debts and credits by 
creating market uncertainty.
The Volcker Shock consequently transformed the US economy into the world’s 
consuming economy by attracting foreign capital into the US Treasury market 
and mortgage debt markets: $85 billion in 1983, $103 225 billion in 1984, $129 
billion in 1985 and $221 billion in 1986 (Krippner 2011, 101). The foreign capital 
contains not only private savings from surplus countries like Japan (Norville 
1998, 117) but, more importantly, foreign monetary authorities enthusiastically 
purchased both US Treasury debts and US government agency debts such as 
‘mortgage securities issued by the Government National Mortgage Association 
(Ginnie Mae), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the Farmers 
Home Administration’ (Duncan 2005, 106). Even though the Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac debt was not directly guaranteed by the US government, it was 
believed that the US monetary authority would intervene in the case of default 
(Ibid, 107). The shift of capital flows from the Eurodollar market into the US 
debt market indicated that the purchasing power of the US public (with the 
strengthening of the US dollar and the massive supply of money) enabled the 
US economy as a whole to become a world consumer society (Schwartz 2014, 
70). After the Volcker Shock, the US economy fell into a deeper current account 
deficit, never experienced before. The US state, however, has increased its 
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financial capacity to sell various US debts.
Bringing inflation under control was a great achievement of the US Federal 
Reserve. Leadership of Paul Volcker was indeed decisive to lead the difficult 
decision process of monetary policy at the FOMC and to prioritize market 
uncertainty as a primary means to control over inflation. His expertise and 
experiences in monetary affairs were certainly an credible asset to the Federal 
Reserve at the time of high inflation and the declining credibility of the Federal 
Reserve. But his strategy towards announced monetary targets over time was 
not entirely new but learned from the study of German monetarist experiences, 
as shown in his 1978 article. His leadership shines out, compared to his prior 
chairman, Miller, as an obvious failure to lead the FOMC effectively. Rather the 
centralized process of monetary policy making within the US Federal Reserve 
in particular the FOMC requires organizational leadership with a high level of 
expertise, experience, and effective communication suitable to lead the diverse 
views of FOMC members across different US regions. In particular the time 
of turbulent US economic situations in the late 1970s required a conservative 
leadership of Volcker to redefine the social meaning of money. Paul Volcker was 
one of the outspoken conservatives to emphasize on monetarism before he was 
appointed as Federal Reserve chairman (Helleiner 1994). Once a monetary policy 
decision is made within the FOMC, the pressure and influence of delivering the 
policy to the outside world largely falls on Federal Reserve chairman. As the 
Volcker Shock draws market actors’ attention into the internal process of Federal 
Reserve monetary policy making, Federal Reserve chairmanship become more 
important to lead the FOMC and communicate to the outside world effectively.
CONCLUSION
The existent IPE literature has evolved to make sense of the Volcker Shock 
in the development of international political economy. The first wave of IPE 
regards it as a post-war subjugation of the US state to the pressure of foreign 
states in the system of inter-states. The second wave helps us better understand 
the monetary shock by adding the power of international financial markets. With 
a focus on the relationship between labor and finance, Marxists understand 
the monetary event as a turning point in the relationship between labor and 
capital. More recent IPE scholars like Konings (2011) contributes to nuanced 
understanding of the monetary shock as processes of institutional configurations 
more functional to the US state and US financial power in international finance. 
Even though the waves of IPE literature have contributed to the understanding 
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of the significance of the monetary event, they do not pay close attention to the 
particular role of the US Federal Reserve as a key actor in governing monetary 
disorder. 
The paper has argued that the significance of Volcker Shock lies neither on 
a subjugation of the US state to the pressure of foreign states nor on power 
of international financial markets, but the transformation of the US Federal 
Reserve from a domestic central bank into a world monetary authority. The 
Volcker Shock ushered in the new beginning of the Federal Reserve’s monetary 
governance as the inner- process of autonomous monetary policy making 
(monetary targeting) under the FOMC. The traditional interest rate management 
of the Federal Reserve was not having any impact on the dynamic force of 
money markets, the Federal Reserve turned to monetary targeting to dampen 
inflationary expectations in the public and international financial markets. The 
operational monetary targeting allowed the Federal Reserve to distance itself 
from the economic need of the US government and to draw careful attention of 
banks to the making of monetary policy at the FOMC meeting. Therefore, the 
US central bank re-established a new relationship with banks in a way that the 
process of FOMC monetary policy making became a new mode of monetary 
governance. Its direct intervention in money markets eventually extended the 
role of lender of last resort beyond US banks. As such, the Volcker Shock should 
be historicized in a way that the Federal Reserve reconfigured itself as a new 
relationship between the US government and international financial markets.
In mainstream economics, ‘credibility’ of the central bank is generally 
associated with independence of the state. Independent central banks are 
assumed to conduct policies of ‘sound’ money (non-inflationary policies) without 
interference from political pressures. In this way, scholars of IPE tend to accept 
the relationship between policies of sound money and market confidence or 
market interests, depending on political spectrum. It seems that sound money 
and financial market confidence is firmly established. The action of the US 
Federal Reserve appears to restore confidence of financial markets associated 
with high levels of interest rates on the credibility of the US dollar, as the second 
wave of the IPE tells us. However, as argued throughout this paper, the action of 
the US Federal Reserve aimed to create market uncertainty which provides little 
ground for market actors to construct interest rate calculation. Therefore, the 
US monetary authority was able to discipline market actors such as businesses, 
labours, and big banks. The assumed relationship between sound money and 
financial market confidence ignores the problem of state power, in particular the 
US monetary authority. 
In other words, policies of sound money are historically more oriented toward 
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empowerment of the state (the English state, for example) than the financial 
market (Knafo 2013). Despite that the US central bank instigated autonomous 
monetary policy away from the economic management of the US government, 
the financial capacity of the US state as a whole has been improved in a way 
that foreign states have continued to purchase US Treasury securities, while 
falling into a deep current account deficit. There is no precise separation of 
monetary and fiscal policies (Gabor 2016, 969). Reflecting on governing the 
2007-8 global financial crisis, IPE scholars still view the role of the US central 
bank narrowly as international lender of last resort (McDowell 2012; Helleiner 
2016). However, the US Federal Reserve not only provided dollar liquidity to 
foreign central banks but also transformed itself from international lender of last 
resort to a ‘maker’ or ‘dealer’ of global financial markets by purchasing illiquid 
private assets from banks and financial institutions (Buiter 2008; Mehrling 
2011). The Federal Reserve even provided ‘value discovery mechanisms’ for 
illiquid private securities (Buiter 2008). The unprecedented role of the Federal 
Reserve can be traced back to the Volcker Shock, as the US monetary authority 
began to unusually expand the provision of collateral for Federal Reserve money 
by including any kind of financial assets. IPE scholarship on transformation of 
central banking is seriously needed. 
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APPENDIX
Figure A1. U.S. Current Account Deficit
Note: The dotted line equals the average current account surplus from 1960 to 1981, and the average current account 
deficit from 1982 to 1994.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, drawn on Hakkio (1995, 13).

